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Is My Family Constitution Unconstitutional? 
By Allison Anna Tait† 
 
[Edward’s] mother explained to him her liberal 
designs, in case of his marrying Miss Morton; told him 
that she would settle on him the Norfolk estate, which, 
clear of land-tax, brings in a good thousand a-
year . . . and in opposition to this, if he still persisted in 
this low connection [to Lucy], represented to him the 
certain penury that must attend the match. 
- Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility1 
 
Introduction 
Every high-wealth family should write a constitution, at least 
that’s what wealth managers say.2 Because, “[w]ithout careful 
planning and stewardship, a hard earned fortune can easily be 
dissipated within a generation or two.”3 The aphorism 
“shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations”4 vividly 
 
† Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Thanks to Erez Aloni, 
Alex Boni-Saenz, Erin Collins, Meredith Harbach, Claudia Haupt, Corinna Lain, 
Luke Norris, Carol Sanger, Sarah Swan and participants in panels at both the 2018 
International Society of Family Law North American Regional Conference: 
Inequality and the Future of Family Law at the University of Minnesota Law School 
and the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association.  
1. JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 232 (Claire Lamont ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1970) (1811). 
       2. High-Net-Worth (HNW) families are worth at least $5M, according to industry 
standards. Ultra-High-Net-Worth (UHNW) families are typically worth $30M by the 
same standards. High Net Worth Individual, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investope
dia.com/terms/h/hnwi.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). Constitutions are also 
recommended for other families, but for those without significant wealth transfer 
and preservation concerns, the needs are different. See Linda C. McClain, Family 
Constitutions and the (New) Constitution of the Family, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 
846 (2006) (discussing the various contexts in which a family may choose to 
implement a constitution). 
      3. JAMES E. HUGHES JR., FAMILY WEALTH: KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY; HOW 
FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL, AND 
FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 3 (rev. & expanded ed. 2004); see also Brian 
Groom, The Rise of the Family Business Constitution, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 13, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5d06ec9e-c61b-11e7-b30e-a7c1c7c13aab (“Where 
the goal of the family is to continue to manage … family wealth collectively across 
the generations, a constitution can be very helpful.”). 
      4. HUGHES, supra note 3, at 3 (“[V]ariations of this proverb are found around the 
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captures this phenomenon and its universalism demonstrates how 
widespread and entrenched the problem is.  
The family constitution, as the name implies, is a 
governance document that a high-wealth family creates (with the 
help of a wealth advisor or wealth consulting team). This 
document sets forth the rules that family members will adhere to 
in order to protect the family fortune from various kinds of 
creditor claims, family feuds, and reckless investments.5 The 
constitutional template provides “an overlying set of family 
principles and governance protocols that keep the different 
interests and parts of the family wealth structures working 
together efficiently and successfully.”6  
Wealth advisors recommend basing family constitutional 
design on political constitutions, in particular the United States 
Constitution.7 To this end, wealth advisors suggesting that it 
contain a statement of values (similar to a preamble), and 
procedures for establishing executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches.8 The executive branch, about which there is little 
 
world.”); see also Shirtsleeves to Shirtsleeves in Three Generations, THE MORGAN 
STANLEY PRIVATE WEALTH MANAGEMENT PODCAST (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.mor
ganstanley.com/what-we-do/wealth-management/private-wealth-management/shirt
sleeves-to-shirtsleeves (“The proverb is certainly not unique to the western 
world. Clogs to clogs, stalls to stalls, rice paddy to rice paddy, shirtsleeves to 
shirtsleeves. It is a universal cultural proverb because it describes human nature.”). 
5. Consultants recommend that a family constitution “include a minimum of 20 
to 25 pages and a maximum of 70 pages (including appendices) when the content is 
more juridical and the family is more complex.” Rocio Arteaga & Susana Menéndez-
Requejo, Family Constitution and Business Performance: Moderating Factors, 30(4) 
FAM. BUS. REV 320, 322 (2017); see also Drawing Up a Family Constitution, BAKER 
TILLY HUGHES BLAKE, https://web.archive.org/web/20171117073820/https://www.ba
kertillyhb.ie/family-constitution/ (“[T]he Constitution can prove a difficult document 
to finalise, with many areas open to conflicting views.”) (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
These consultants also recommend allowing six to eight months to create a 
constitution because “it takes time for family members to agree and commit to the 
Family Constitution.” Arteaga & Menéndez-Requejo, supra, at 323. 
 6. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, THE FAMILY CONSTITUTION GUIDE 6 (2014), https://u
nited-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/documents/get/88/the-family-constitution-guide.p
df. 
7. One consultant clarifies that there is really only one choice in terms of political 
rule: “Every family I know . . . decides that a republic is the best system of family 
governance.” HUGHES, supra note 3, at 24. 
 8. Alexander Koeberle-Schmid, The Benefits of a Family Constitution, KPMG 
(July 10, 2017), https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2017/07/a-family-consti
tution-increases-family-cohesion-and-business-connectivity.html (“[Creating a 
family constitution] can take between six to twelve months.”); Rupert Walker, The 
Lasting Legacy, THE PEAK 90, 92 (BNY Mellon), https://www.bnymellonwealth.com/
assets/pdfs-strategy/the_peak_chuck_long.pdf (“Typically, this process lasts one or 
two years.”). But c.f. Family Constitution, ATENEO FAM. BUS. DEV. CTR., http://atene
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discussion, may act as an administrative branch or may consist 
of a council that possesses the authority to make quick decisions 
on either routine matters or in emergency situations.9 The 
legislative branch is tasked with creating rules to govern the 
behavior of family members in a variety of domains, but 
especially on matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, and death 
– events that have the potential to be costly in a financial sense 
without the proper legal safeguards.10 Finally, the judicial branch, 
using family constitutions, mediate when family members 
encounter conflict or violate rules, to offer advisory opinions on 
matters of family business, or to adjudicate issues of concern.11 
 But why, precisely, do wealth advisors suggest a 
constitution? Why not a mission statement or a strategic plan, 
building on the family-as-business analogy? Constitutions are 
critical, wealth advisors state, because they create a structure to 
govern all family members and their relationships to family 
wealth.12 The constitution acts as a governance mechanism – a 
form of disciplinary technology – and enables a high-wealth 
family to control the behavior of its members in a way that other 
expressions of family purpose, like a mission statement, do not. 
The family constitution is more than a set of bylaws, a plan for 
inheritance, or the documentation of family aspirations.13 A 
family constitution is a scaffold that supports and regulates the 
family by imposing a governmental frame.14 
Despite the fact that wealth managers use this analogy 
between family and political constitution unwaveringly, one 
 
ofamilybusiness.weebly.com/constitution-crafting.html (offering a two-day workshop 
to craft a family constitution). 
 9. Family Governance–The Why, What, and How for Affluent Families, LEBEL 
& HARRIMAN (Oct. 25, 2017), http://lebelharriman.com/resources/news/article/2017/
10/25/family-governance--why-what-affluent-families/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. We the Family: The Benefits of Creating a Family Constitution, BROWN 
BROTHERS HARRIMAN (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bbh.com/en-us/insights/we-the-
family--the-benefits-of-creating-a-family-constitution-24624 (“Traditional governing 
documents such as shareholders’ agreements, company bylaws and even estate 
planning documents are characterized by technical language necessary to achieve 
desired legal, tax and administrative results. This language is not appropriate for a 
family constitution.”) (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
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question never addressed in the financial planning discourse is: 
“How perfect is the analogy between the [family constitution] 
and the U.S. Constitution?”15  No analogy is, of course, perfect. 
And no one expects a family constitution to replicate the U.S. 
constitution in exact detail. Nevertheless, by taking on the form 
of a political and democratic constitution, the family constitution 
raises the question of what constitutional principles inhere in and 
guide this specialized document. 
This brief Article posits that the analogy between the two 
types of constitutions is imperfect in several significant ways and 
mainly because family constitutions largely ignore some of the 
core principles that animate a democratic constitution. 
Specifically, family constitutions fail to protect minority groups 
through a guarantee of equal protection. Likewise, family 
members embroiled in conflict lack due process rights, rights that 
would help ensure fair treatment and a more transparent exercise 
of governmental authority. Finally, the typical family 
constitution template fails to provide any mechanism for 
amending the constitution, enabling the document to remain 
responsive to changing circumstances and the needs of the family 
polity. 
The family constitution may, in certain respects, mimic the 
United States Constitution by layering structure over family 
interactions. Whereas the United States Constitution sets forth 
the rights and responsibilities of citizens, the family constitution 
centers primarily on the responsibilities of family members. In 
order for the comparison between the constitutions to be a 
dynamic one, a family constitution should also protect the rights 
of family members, providing safeguards against embedded 
forms of discrimination as well as other instances of 
inappropriate dead-hand control. In other words, a family 
constitution need not and should not run the risk of its provisions 
contravening constitutional values. 
I. Family Law Rules 
The family constitution template is first and foremost “[a] 
tool intended to help the family to stay together and to stay 
wealthy for more than three generations.”16 Accordingly, family 
 
 15. McClain, supra note 2, at 840. McClain takes a different track in her article 
than the approach taken here. She uses family constitutions to explore the difference 
between a constructivist model of the family and the “natural” model. Id. at 836. 
16. CHRISTIAN G. STEWART, FAMILY LEGACY ASIA (HK) LTD., HOW TO CRAFT 
YOUR OWN FAMILY CONSTITUTION: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2013), http://www.familylegacy
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events and relationships that implicate wealth distribution and 
erosion are a special concern for the family government.17 One 
of the core areas of regulation, then, is what we would consider 
family wealth rules–rules concerning marriage, divorce, and the 
transfer of wealth on death. Wealth advisors recommend that 
families pay particular attention to these rules because 
“[u]nexpected death, or the divorce of a family member . . . can 
paralyse a structure and produce major problems and uncertainty 
for the family members who have a stake in the family wealth 
structures.”18  
In this Section, I describe what typical family wealth rules 
look like in a family constitution and analyze the ways in which 
the typical rules may constrain the behavior of family members. 
A. Marriage Rules 
One of the most important tasks delegated to the family 
legislature is to craft the rules that govern family marital 
relationships.19 Advisors suggest that families pay particular 
attention to divorce because “[m]atrimonial breakdown is a 
major problem for family wealth structures.”20 Divorce, advisors 
warn, has the potential to be “one of the world’s biggest 
destroyers of wealth. . .[because]. . .laws designed to protect a 
spouse can be abused to provide a spouse with rights to family 
businesses and wealth that by no stretch of the imagination 




17. The other most important area of law for the family is corporate law. Family 
legislatures are encouraged to create a system of rules to facilitate the smooth 
running of the family business. See, e.g., McClain, supra note 2, at 865–68. 
18. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 9. A family constitution might also 
address “the risk that a family member becomes the ‘black sheep’ of the family in 
that they fail to properly engage with the family office/businesses or with the ethos 
of the family.” Id. at 7. Or, the constitution might govern the procedure for dealing 
with “a substantial claim brought by a creditor against the family.” Id. at 9. A card 
game makes this clear— Keeps Me Awake at Night—where “[e]ach card describes a 
particular issue related to wealth, like ‘Legacy’ or ‘Illness & Death.’” Robert Milburn, 
SunTrust Uses Games to Help Clients Prioritize Finances, BARRON’S (Oct. 2, 2015), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/suntrust-uses-games-to-help-clients-prioritize-fin
ances-1443801518. 
19. McClain, supra note 2, at 865–68. 
20. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 33. 
21.  PHILIP MARCOVICI, THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF FAMILY WEALTH: A GUIDE 
TO SUCCESSION PLANNING, ASSET PROTECTION, TAXATION, AND WEALTH 
MANAGEMENT 107, 112 (2016). 
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In a number of jurisdictions, wealth managers warn that it is 
easy to secure the court’s jurisdiction to deal with matrimonial 
disputes and  also to persuade the court “to take a robust approach 
to family wealth structures.”22 Wealth managers routinely stress 
the significant discretion that family court judges have (the U.K. 
is often used as an example), such that even placing family assets 
in a discretionary asset-protection trust might not suffice to 
protect them at divorce. High-profile divorces such as the 2014 
Poon case in which the wife of Otto Poon received a payout of 
over HK$700 million after trust assets were determined to be 
marital property23 have reinforced this message.24 
To address the problem of divorce, family constitutions 
routinely dictate certain protocols for family members who are 
planning marriage, most commonly requiring that they create 
prenuptial agreements. Prenuptial agreements allow the high-
wealth family “to ‘ring-fence’ family wealth that a son or 
daughter may have inherited or will be inheriting during their 
lifetime.”25 This “ring-fencing” is accomplished mostly by 
specifying certain characterizations of marital and separate 
property, what assets will go to each spouse in the event of a 
divorce, and choice of law preferences.26 Wealth managers claim 
that putting such protocols in the family constitution may be an 
advantage not just for the family balance sheet but also for the 
family member contemplating marriage: “What’s great about this 
approach is it allows your daughter to tell her future husband, 
‘this prenuptial agreement isn’t my idea, my family is making me 
do it,’ which could smooth over what would otherwise be a 
difficult conversation.”27 To ensure the effectiveness of the 
 
22. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 33. 
23. Julie Chu, HK$766m Divorce Payout for Ex-Wife of Leading Engineer Otto 
Poon, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 17, 2014), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1555849/hk766-m-divorce-payout-ex-wife-leading-engineer-otto-poon. 
24. Jennifer Hughes, Hong Kong Divorce Case Rattles Family Trust Industry, 
FIN. TIMES (July 17, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/f953e8e4-0d92-11e4-815f-
00144feabdc0. 
25. Abby Schultz, Prenuptial Agreements Gain Traction in Asia, BARRON’S (Dec. 
18, 2015), https://www.barrons.com/articles/prenuptial-agreements-gain-traction-
in-asia-1450409202. 
26. See TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 7 (“For example, [the constitution] 
can seek to anticipate and deal with difficult situations such as the marriage 
breakdown of certain members of the family.”). 
27. Schultz, supra note 25 (“It’s a much better sales pitch . . . But writing a 
prenuptial agreement requirement into a family constitution, while practiced in 
Europe and the U.S., is not common among wealthy families in East Asia, at least 
not yet.”) (internal citations omitted); see TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 16 
(“A structured dialogue . . . will de-sensitize these issues and foster an environment 
2019] Is My Family Constitution Unconstitutional? 7 
prenuptial agreement, wealth advisors also recommend that the 
family constitution mandate the creation of small trusts for all 
individuals who marry into the family. These small trusts, 
advisors remark, “throw a bone to the divorcing sons- and 
daughters-in-law, heading off challenges to the real family 
wealth.”28 
Family constitutions may, in addition to requiring a 
prenuptial agreement, include provisions about who family 
members may marry. For example, in the well-known case of 
Shapira v. Union National Bank, a father conditioned a bequest 
to one of his sons such that the son “should receive his share of 
the bequest only if he is married at the time of my death to a 
Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish.”29 If the son did not 
marry a Jewish girl within seven years after the death of the 
father, then the money was to go to the State of Israel.30 Family 
constitutions could, likewise, stipulate that family members were 
required to marry within a certain race or ethnicity—or 
alternately prohibit certain marital unions based on race, 
ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation.31  
Accordingly, marriage law rules in family constitutions may 
further the family’s wealth preservation goals but these rules may 
also abridge the marital choices and freedom of family members. 
B. Wealth Transfer on Death 
Death is another event in the family wealth timeline that can 
trouble wealth management if the proper planning is not put into 
place—and an event wealth managers recommend families 
address. Here again, family constitutions can be extremely useful 
in providing a reliable framework for wealth transfer upon the 
death of family members. Estate planning done through the 
family constitution not only helps families avoid probate 
proceedings and transfer tax on death, but also ensures that 
family assets are distributed according to a well-designed plan 
rather than through default rules. Advisors emphasize that the 
 
of understanding and mutual respect.”). 
28. BROOKE HARRINGTON, CAPITAL WITHOUT BORDERS: WEALTH MANAGERS AND 
THE ONE PERCENT 164 (2016) (emphasis in original). 
29.  Shapira v. Union National Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1974). 
30. Id. 
31. Incentive trusts, which are popular mechanisms for extending control over 
family members, are used to the same effect and condition the receipt of trust 
distributions on a wide array of conditions, from school enrollment to sobriety to 
staying married. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 9–10 (10th ed. 2017). 
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family constitution is not the place to detail the substance of an 
estate plan—that is most likely done in trust documents and 
perhaps an accompanying will. Nevertheless, the family 
constitution can add detail to the estate planning documents and 
put them in context with more personal detail than might go into 
the legal documents.32 
Some family constitution rules might be practical without 
being onerous, placing little burden on family members. Family 
constitutions might require, for example, that all family members 
engage in estate planning by creating a will or trust, make 
provisions for guardians as needed, and keep beneficiary 
designations up-to-date. Family constitution rules for wealth 
transfer might also, however, burden or constrain the rights of 
certain family members. Safeguarding family wealth as much as 
possible, the family constitution might outline general 
expectations of who a family member’s beneficiaries will be at 
death and might circumscribe bequests or transfers outside the 
family. This is particularly true if the wealth transfer involves 
shares in the family business and an accompanying transfer of 
organizational leadership. The family constitution might, in these 
cases, contain directives about succession planning in the family 
business and might dictate the transfer of leadership (and 
ownership) to one particular person in the family. Ideally, the 
family would discuss and debate all of these provisions. 
Nevertheless, these kinds of provisions could be included by the 
family founder or other family leaders without discussion or even 
notice. 
Ultimately, then, because family law directives can help 
manage  how money flows in and out of the family at marriage, 
divorce, and death, family legislatures must provide rules and 
guidelines for dealing with these major family events in order to 
maximize wealth preservation. 
II. Family Member Rights 
While family constitutions set forth, sometimes in great detail, 
the responsibilities of family members in the great project of 
managing family money, these same documents are almost 
uniformly silent about some of the most basic rights of family 
members. In this Section, I discuss how this lack of certain family 
member rights creates a disjuncture with the constitutional 
 
32. See Deborah S. Gordon, Mor[t]ality, and Identity: Wills, Narratives, and 
Cherished Possessions, 28(2) YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 266–67 (2016). 
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framing and democratic aspirations of the high-wealth families 
writing family constitutions. 
A. The Absent Equal Protection Clause 
One ‘constitutional’ principle that is notably absent from the 
family constitution template is any mention—much less 
guarantee—of equality or non-discrimination. A hallmark of 
most democratic constitutions has typically been a statement of 
equality between citizens.33 One example of this type of equality 
safeguard appears in the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.34 This Clause protects 
citizens from rules that draw a distinction among people based 
on specific characteristics, such as race, gender, age, disability, 
or other traits, attempting to both recognize, secure, and preserve 
minority-group rights.35  
Citizenship built through the family constitution brings few, 
if any, assurances of equal treatment among family members or 
safeguards of the right to be safe from discrimination. 
Accordingly, as discussed in the previous section, family 
constitutions may include provisions with marital restrictions 
that evidence various kinds of bias or discriminatory intent. What 
are we to make, then, of the constitutionality of a family 
constitution with such provisions? 
Courts have already taken up and answered some of these 
questions about the constitutionality in the context of restricted 
bequests. In Shapira, where the father required his son to marry 
a Jewish woman in order to inherit, the court ruled that the 
bequest did not infringe the son’s constitutional rights because he 
was indeed free to marry whomever he wished, even though his 
choice might entail a financial cost.36 Because the conditional 
 
33.  See generally Freedom and Equality, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://w
ww.americanbar.org/groups/civics/freedom_and_equality.html (offering a civics 
educational curriculum exploring freedom and equality in the United States). 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This constitutional amendment was ratified 
following the U.S. Civil War. “The Constitution as originally drafted and ratified had 
no provisions assuring equal protection of the laws. This, of course, is not surprising 
for a document written for a society where blacks were enslaved and where women 
were routinely discriminated against.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
711 (4th ed. 2013). 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, at 716. 
36. Id. at 827–28. “In the case at bar, this court is not being asked to enforce any 
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bequest did not did not place a total ban on the son’s marrying, 
the ban did not violate public policy.37 Reinforcing this 
conclusion, was the fact that no child has any legal right or 
entitlement to an inheritance (unlike a surviving spouse).38 Any 
bequest, gift, or trust distribution that a child receives is, legally 
speaking, an act of generosity rather than the fulfillment of an 
expectation.39 
Shapira, accordingly, demonstrates the limits of 
constitutional thinking regarding restrictions placed on marriage 
in the inheritance context. Nevertheless, the ruling in Shapira has 
its own limits and other, different restrictions might easily violate 
public policy in the constitutional calculus—especially 
restrictions aimed at limiting a family members marriage 
according to race or gender. Restrictions in a family constitution 
that place a total restraint on a family member’s right to marry 
or, alternately, encourage divorce would clearly be against 
constitutional principle and public policy.40 Consequently, if 
families want to take seriously the notion of a democratic family 
constitution and all the guarantees that come with it, then it is 
important the document provide certain protections against 
inequality and discrimination.   
B. The Due Process Deficit 
Another constitutional principle intimately connected to 
democratic governance is that of due process. Due process rights 
are meant to provide citizens with certain protections against 
arbitrary decision-making, unchecked judicial discretion, and 
undisclosed processes.41 The right of due process generally 
“refers to the procedures that the government must follow before 
 
restriction upon Daniel Jacob Shapira’s constitutional right to marry. Rather, this 
court is being asked to enforce the testator’s restriction upon his son’s 
inheritance.” Id. at 827. 
37. Id. at 829. “It is the conclusion of this court that public policy should not, and 
does not preclude the fulfillment of Dr. Shapira’s purpose, and that in accordance 
with the weight of authority in this country, the conditions contained in his will are 
reasonable restrictions upon marriage, and valid.” Id. at 832. 
38. Id. at 828. A surviving spouse cannot be disinherited because of the elective 
share, etc. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 31, at 521. 
39. Id. 
40. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 31, at 12 (“The weight of authority 
holds that a total or general restraint on marriage or a provision encouraging divorce 
is void as contrary to public policy unless the donor’s dominant purpose was to 
provide support until marriage or in the event of a divorce.”). 
 41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, at 1143. 
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it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.”42 This is another 
way in which the family constitution template falls short. The 
typical family constitution makes no mention of due process 
rights. On the contrary, some of the judicial provisions and 
procedures included in the family constitution may actually run 
the risk of unfairly abridging the due process rights of family 
members.  
The judicial branch as established by a family constitution 
is, broadly construed, meant to help families navigate conflict by 
providing “protocols”43 or a “road map”44 to deal with problems. 
And, ideally, creating and maintaining a judicial branch allows 
family problems to be resolved with the least amount of 
emotional and psychological drama possible: “The desired 
outcome is rational economic and family welfare decisions that 
are not overwhelmed by traditional family dynamics.”45 
Nowhere in the family constitution literature, however, do the 
concepts of fair hearing and procedural rights factor into the 
design of the family judiciary.   
In general, the dispute resolution process as managed by the 
judicial branch is envisioned as something more akin to 
mentoring or mediation. Wealth advisors suggest that this is a 
role particularly suited to “family elders”46 who have the 
necessary experience and wisdom to confront and navigate 
conflicts when they arise.47 One example epitomizes this 
emphasis on friendly intermediation: “The members of one 
business-owning family hold a family meeting every six months. 
. . In addition to a facilitator, the family meetings are always 
 
 42. Id. In the United States Constitution, due process rights are—like equal 
protection rights—enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
43. Arteaga & Menéndez-Requejo, supra note 8, at 322. 
44. See Four Keys to Writing Your Family Constitution for 2016, STEWARDSHIP 
(Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.stewardship.com/articles/4-keys-to-writing-your-family
-constitution. 
45. ERNESTO J. POZA, FAMILY GOVERNANCE: HOW LEADING FAMILIES MANAGE 
THE CHALLENGES OF WEALTH 3 (Credit Suisse Group 2016), https://www.credit-
suisse.com/media/assets/apac/docs/cs-family-governance-white-paper.pdf. 
46. Id. If the family group is a small one, the judicial decision-makers may be the 
parents, which may already be problematic since parents are inherently vested with 
a positional authority that children may be unwilling to question. HUGHES, supra 
note 3, at 22 (“[T]hese matters naturally flow up for decision to my parents.”). 
47. A family elder is, according to one advisor, not necessarily defined by age but 
rather by their ability “to bridge the communication gap between generations.” 
Stewart, supra note 16, at 48. 
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attended by a retired uncle-in-law, whose business sense and 
judgment is respected by the founder and the sons.”48 This type 
of advisory role fits neatly with the “family elder” persona, and 
many examples given by wealth advisors focus on this type of 
family business mentoring.49 In this way, the judicial branch can 
help family members navigate the wealth preservation rules by 
offering a form of advisory opinions.50  
Unsurprisingly, however, other situations can and do arise 
in which the family judiciary might be called upon to act in a 
more arbitral role: “Family elders can be given the authority in 
the family constitution to facilitate resolutions when there are 
disputes among family members, or otherwise have 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with the family’s conflict-
resolution processes.”51 When these kinds of more persistent and 
acrimonious family conflicts arise, several due process problems 
with the family constitution become more evident.  
First, the family constitution literature contains no language 
about judicial sanctions or sentencing—the consequences of 
violating family constitution rules are never mentioned. What 
penalties, then, would be at the disposal of the “Council of 
Family Elders” and how might the Council evaluate the 
situation? The most obvious penalties would be financial ones—
family members who violate family constitution rules might be 
in danger of losing access to trust distributions, an allowance, 
family employment, or other types of financial subsidy from the 
family coffers. Losing a bequest or trust distribution might not be 
against constitutional principles, as Shapira teaches us. 
Nevertheless, the potentially arbitrary nature of these kinds of ad 
hoc penalties and sanctions, imposed without notice, present a 
troubling fit with democratic constitutional principles of due 
process. 
A second problem with the judicial management of the 
family is that family members are often barred from taking their 
grievances outside of the family. One wealth management 
company presents an interesting example in which a son 
disagreed “with his father, and other senior executives of the 
 
 48. Stewart, supra note 16, at 47. 
   49. Id. 
 50. Hughes states that one of the roles of the judicial branch is to “[r]ender the 
advisory opinions to the family.” HUGHES, supra note 3, at 174. 
 51. The same advisor suggests that the family elder role might be performed by 
a trust protectors committee. Id. 
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family business . . . .”52 Their dispute resulted in an attempt on 
the son’s part to begin “legal proceedings in a jurisdiction that 
would have resulted in a public and damaging fight over his 
position.”53 Fortunately for the family, the wealth manager 
remarks, “clearly stated family protocols” in the family 
constitution prevented the son from taking such action and 
safeguarded the family’s wealth, privacy, and reputation.54 These 
kinds of restrictions on access to decision-making fora and public 
processes could be construed as a violation of the family 
member’s due process rights, especially if the family member has 
not consented to abide by such terms and conditions. 
Providing a window into how these kinds of clauses in 
family constitutions may or may not inhibit due process rights, 
courts are currently addressing similar kinds of conditions in the 
context of mandatory arbitration clauses in both wills and trust 
documents. For example, in a 2004 case from Arizona, 
Schoneberger v. Oelze,55 the court considered the validity of a 
trust created by parents for their two daughters that “set[] out in 
minute detail dispute resolution procedures.”56 These procedures 
were ordered in “progressive stages of increasing complexity and 
involvement,” beginning with a “‘Stage One-Notice of 
Discomfort’ and ending with a ‘Stage Six-Arbitration.’”57 When 
the daughters brought claims against the trustee to court ten years 
later,58  the court held that the beneficiaries had not given their 
consent to arbitration and, consequently, mandatory arbitration 
was unacceptable.59 
Family constitution framers who want their constitutions to 
align not just in form but also in substance with democratic 
constitutions should demonstrate a concern for the due process 
rights of all family members. Family framers should task the 
judiciary branch with creating standardized responses to family 
 
52. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 11. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. Again, the literature is largely silent on what penalties might have 
befallen the son if he had violated the family protocol. 
55. 96 P.3d 1078, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded by statute, Act of May 
21, 2008, ch. 247, § 16, 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1119 (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-
10205 (2012)). 
56. Id. at 1080. 
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
       55. Approximately ten years after the trusts were created, the daughters 
brought claims of breach of trust, conversion, and fraudulent concealment against 
the trustees, claiming in addition that the trustees had mismanaged and dissipated 
the trust funds. Id. 
59. Id. at 1083–84. 
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constitution violations and seek ratification and approval of these 
terms and conditions from the larger family. Family constitutions 
will be constitutional in principle as well as configuration only 
when the guarantee of procedural safeguards and fair processes 
for family members is in place.  
C. The Overlooked Amendment Process 
Finally, family constitutions should address processes for 
modification in order to actualize the constitutional principles of 
their political counterparts. Ideally, any problems of 
discriminatory rules or unfair processes that arise with a family 
constitution should be able to be addressed, as needed, through 
constitutional amendment.60 The ability to amend outdated 
provisions and the mechanism for doing so are essential if the 
constitution is to remain responsive to circumstances and vital 
within its time: “Changes in social organization, in technology, 
and in morality all require that the constitution evolve . . . Those 
drafting a constitution cannot possibly imagine the myriad of 
issues that will arise decades and centuries later.”61 In the 
language of family wealth, the ability to amend a governing 
document helps to mitigate the excesses and inefficiencies of 
dead-hand control.62 
Family constitutions generally do not contain a mechanism 
for amendment or even any language to address the problems of 
an unchanging document. One wealth consultant, going against 
the grain, has recognized this problem and states: “It is unrealistic 
to expect a single, unrevised family constitution to withstand the 
many changes that will occur in the future …. [and] future family 
members may not feel an allegiance to a constitution that they 
did not have a hand in creating.”63 The lack of an amendment 
mechanism can lead to a certain strain of family constitutions that 
 
60. The United States Constitution provides a mechanism for amendment in 
Article 5: “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of 
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes. . .” U.S. CONST. art. V. 
61. Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561, 
1561 (1998). 
62. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts 
in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985). 
63.  Karin Prangley & Anne Warren, We the Family: The Benefits of Creating a 
Family Constitution, Brown Brothers Harriman (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bbh.co
m/en-us/insights/we-the-family--the-benefits-of-creating-a-family-constitution-2462
4. 
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another wealth manager calls “Monument to the Founder” 
constitutions, meant to “honor the extraordinary achievements of 
the heroic wealth creator.”64 
Many family constitutions represent this kind of 
“monument” to a founding family member or an original 
generational cohort of members. They are documents created to 
memorialize the legacy of the person or people who started the 
family dynasty or business—sometimes even written by that 
same person. One of the problems with this type of constitution 
is that, “the bigger the Monument to the Founder, the bigger the 
shadow it can cast.”65 Consequently, this kind of constitution can 
be “restrictive,” typified by the lack of provision “for easy or fair 
exit mechanisms [and by an] unwillingness to have to deal with 
the ‘messiness’ of divergent voices and opinions.”66 From this 
perspective, these kinds of family constitutions are more akin to 
a will or trust instrument that exists to express the will of the 
settlor than to a democratic constitution. The traditional rule, in 
fact, was that irrevocable trusts could be modified only in limited 
circumstances, based on respect for testator intent: “[A] testator 
has a right to dispose of his own property with such restrictions 
and limitations, not repugnant to law, as he sees fit, and . . . his 
intentions ought to be carried out, unless they contravene some 
positive rule of law, or are against public policy.”67 
The need for an amendment process becomes more obvious 
and pressing when one views the family constitution as a 
democratic constitution rather than an amplified trust document. 
As one scholar comments: “Formal provision for constitutional 
amendment is now a near universal feature of national 
 
64. CHRISTIAN G. STEWART, FAMILY LEGACY ASIA (HK) LTD., THE THREE FAMILY 
CONSTITUTION ARCHETYPES 1 (2015), at 3. The same advisor writes that the 
“Monument to the Founder” family constitution is one of the “three basic family 
constitution archetypes.” Id. at 1. The others are “Family First Constitution” and 
“Expert Structure.” Id. 
65. Id. at 3. 
66. Id. “It might be created in a top down fashion without any real participation 
from the members of the rising generation of the family.” Id. 
67. Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889). Even long-standing, 
irrevocable trusts can be modified under the right circumstances. The Claflin 
doctrine states that a trust can be modified with the consent of all beneficiaries and 
if the modification is not contrary to a material purpose of the trust. See id. The 
Uniform Trust Code has softened the requirement somewhat, stating that the 
modification must not be “inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.” See 
UNIF. TR. CODE § 411(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). The Uniform Trust Code also 
eliminates the requirement of consent from all beneficiaries as long as all interests 
are adequately protected. See id. § 411(e). 
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constitutions.”68 Democratic constitutions, in the main, provide 
some mechanism for amendment. For example, Article V of the 
U.S. Constitution allows for constitutional amendment if the 
proposed change is properly ratified by the states.69 Whatever 
shape they take, mechanisms are important because they 
“promote processes of democratic self-government” and help 
“facilitate certain valuable forms of constitutional pre-
commitment, particularly those having to do with minority rights 
and inclusion.”70 Family constitutions that are “monuments” to 
the legacy of the constitution founders risk impairing these 
democratic and inclusion values in ways we have already seen.  
 High-wealth families with constitutions should, therefore, 
consider ways to create amendment power within their governing 
documents. The legislative body, already constituted by the 
family constitution, could easily be tasked with crafting a 
procedure for constitutional amendment. Moreover, most family 
constitutions provide for family assemblies and meetings at 
which family members could vote on such proposals. Morgan 
Stanley, in the family constitution template that the company 
provides, does just this. Section seven of the template states” 
“The Family Advisory Board may take any action it deems 
appropriate … including amending the Constitution or its By-
laws, with the written consent of a majority of its then acting 
voting members.”71 
Creating an amendment power through family deliberation 
and ratification would help transform a family constitution from 
being a “monument” constitution to a “family first” constitution 
that places a “premium on the family values of togetherness, 
 
 68. Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative 
Perspective, 1 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 
No. 347, 2011), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=10
70&context=public_law_and_legal_theory. There is great variation of what the rules 
look like and in the level of difficulty. 
 69.  “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the 
legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing 
amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part 
of this Constitution, when ratified ….” U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 70. Dixon, supra note 68, at 102. 
 71. Family Constitutions and Family By-Laws, MORGAN STANLEY https://adviso
r.morganstanley.com/michelle.ward/documents/field/w/wa/ward-sofia-michelle/Fam
ily_Constitution_and_Family_By_Laws.pdf. 
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equality and harmony”72 or a “wise” constitution that reflects an 
“aware[ness] of the culture and capacity and skills of the client 
family, as well as the transitions the family are facing.”73 
Furthermore, regardless of the label put on the family 
constitution, creating amendment power would help families 
realize the constitutional values they seek to capture when 
choosing to write a constitution.  
Conclusion 
No one expects a family constitution to replicate a 
democratic constitution in each and every way possible. Families 
are not vast political entities and they do not require the same 
sophisticated level of governance that states do. Nevertheless, 
family constitutions attempt to capture the form of a democratic 
constitution and import its foundational design. It is also 
therefore apt to measure the substance of the family constitution 
against that of the democratic constitution, seeking an integration 
of the democratic principles that enliven and illuminate political 
constitutions. What emerges from this mapping exercise is that 
family constitutions, in their current iterative state, focus on the 
regulation and responsibilities of the family citizenry, failing 
sometimes to secure and safeguard basic rights of equality and 
fairness. To be constitutional both in design and principle, these 
family governance documents must change. They must guarantee 
family member rights and remedies and ensure that the 
constitution, through amendment, remains sufficiently flexible 
and relevant to meet family needs through the generations. 
 
 
 72. STEWART, supra note 64, at 4. 
 73. Id. 
